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Abstract
We survey recent literature comparing ination targeting (IT) and
price-level targeting (PT) as macroeconomic stabilization policies. Our
focus is on New Keynesian models and areas which have seen signi-
cant developments since Amblers (2009) survey: the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates; nancial frictions; and optimal monetary policy.
Amblers main conclusion that PT improves the ination-output volatility
trade-o¤ in New Keynesian models is reasonably robust to these exten-
sions, several of which are attempts to address issues raised by the recent
nancial crisis. The benecial e¤ects of PT therefore appear to hang on
the joint assumption that agents are rational and the economy New Key-
nesian. Accordingly, we discuss recent experimental and survey evidence
on whether expectations are rational, as well as the applied macro litera-
ture on the empirical performance of New Keynesian models. In addition,
we discuss a more recent strand of applied literature that has formally
tested New Keynesian models with rational expectations. Overall the ev-
idence is not conclusive, but we note that New Keynesian models are able
to match a number of dynamic features in the data and that behavioral
models of the macroeconomy are outperformed by those with rational
expectations in formal statistical tests. Accordingly, we argue that
policymakers should continue to pay attention to PT.
1 Introduction
The past two decades have seen a resurgence of interest in optimal monetary
policy, including research on potential alternatives to ination targeting (IT).
In this survey, we focus on an alternative policy that is considered a serious con-
tender to IT: price-level targeting (PT). Under a PT regime, the central bank
attempts to stabilize the aggregate price level (eg the CPI) around a predeter-
mined target price path. Hence, for example, if there is an inationary shock
We would like to thank Tony Yates and Alfred Duncan for useful comments.
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that takes the price level above the target price path, below-average ination is
required next period in order to return the price level to target. This contrasts
with an IT regime where ination stabilization is the goal of policy and above
average ination today would be followed by average (ie on-target) ination to-
morrow. In other words, bygones are bygonesunder IT, but the opposite is
true under PT.
Our survey begins by discussing recent developments in the PT literature
on macro stabilization. We focus on New Keynesian models and important
developments since Amblers (2009) survey, which can be grouped under three
headings: optimal monetary policy; the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates; and nancial frictions. Several of these recent developments are initial
attempts to address issues raised by the nancial crisis. The main theoretical
nding of the survey is that Amblers original conclusion that PT can improve
the ination-output volatility trade-o¤ in New Keynesian models remains intact,
albeit that the list of caveats is much longer. In particular, we note an inter-
esting split in the literature: PT consistently outperforms IT in New Keynesian
models where policymakers commit to instrument rules of the kind advocated
by Taylor (1993), but results in favour of PT which are derived from optimal
policies under either commitment or discretion are generally quite fragile
to the assumptions one makes about the economic environment faced by the
policymaker. We also argue, however, that the second case is the one of least
interest for real-world central banks, because optimal policies do not perform
well across a range of alternative models of the economy and are more di¢ cult to
implement than simple Taylor-type rules. In this sense the performance of PT
in New Keynesian models is fairly robust to extensions to the basic framework.
This encourages us to focus on the key assumptions on which the benecial ef-
fects of PT are known to hang are economic agents rational and the economy
New Keynesian?
With this question in mind, the second half of the survey considers recent
experimental and survey literature on rational expectations, and the applied
macro literature on the empirical performance of New Keynesian models. Both
these areas have seen important developments in recent years and they o¤er
di¤erent insights. On the one hand, experiments and surveys tend to reject
the strict rational expectations hypothesis, but we note that there are potential
problems with micro evidence of this kind, several of which we discuss in detail.
On the other hand, the recent literature on the empirical performance of New
Keynesian models initiated by Christiano et al. (2005) is broadly supportive
but should be treated with caution because it does not amount to a formal
statistical test of New Keynesian models with rational expectations. There is,
however, a more recent strand of applied macro literature that has formally
tested New Keynesian models and alternative expectational assumptions. We
explain the intuition and methodology behind this approach before discussing
some of the main results from this growing literature. Overall, the evidence
on rational expectations and New Keynesian models is far from clear-cut, but
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we note that these models are able to match a number of important dynamic
features in the data, and that behavioral models of the macroeconomy seem to
be outperformed by those with rational expectations in formal statistical tests.
We also argue that when considering macroeconomic policy and its e¤ects on
the economy, priority should be given to macroeconomic evidence in cases where
it is able to establish results on strong statistical grounds.
In a concluding section we consider the policy implications of the survey.
We think there are two main lessons. First, from a theoretical perspective, the
performance of PT is surprisingly robust to initial attempts to address issues
raised by the nancial crisis by extending the standard New Keynesian model.
If anything, then, the events of the crisis appear to have strengthened the case
for PT at least based on the available theoretical models. As Walsh (2011)
cautions, this literature is at an early stage, with many of the key trade-o¤s
raised by the crisis not yet fully understood by policymakers and academics.
Building models that can speak to these issues should therefore be high on the
research agenda and, in time, these models should become useful tools to (re-
)assess the case for a change in monetary policy regime to PT. The second lesson
is that there is a strong disconnect between experimental and survey evidence
on rational expectations on the one hand, and the applied macro literature on
the empirical performance of New Keynesian models on the other. However,
since behavioral models of the macroeconomy are outperformed by those with
rational expectations in formal statistical tests at the macro level, and there are
serious potential problems with surveys and experiments at the micro level, we
argue that policymakers should continue to pay attention to PT. Indeed, the
available applied macro evidence suggests that widespread concerns about ra-
tional expectations and New Keynesian models in the aftermath of the nancial
crisis may be unwarranted.
2 The baseline New Keynesian model
2.1 The model
The distinguishing feature of New Keynesian models is that monopolistically-
competitive rms set their prices optimally to maximise prots, subject to con-
straints on how frequently they can re-set prices or how costly it is to do so.
In the baseline specication due to Calvo (1983), each rm can change its price
with a constant probability, so that the interval between price changes is a ran-
dom variable. Prot maximization by rms leads to a rst-order condition that
relates current price to a mark-up on marginal cost and the expected future
price. Log-linearizing this rst-order condition around a zero-ination steady-
state and aggregating across rms leads to the New Keynesian Phillips curve
in which economy-wide ination, denoted t, is related to the output gap and
expected future ination:
t= Ett+1+xt+ut (1)
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where xt is the output gap,  is the discount factor of the representative
household (the sole owner of rms),  > 0 is the slope of the Phillips curve,
and ut is a cost-push shock that follows an AR(1) process.
Equation (1) states that current ination depends positively on (rationally)
expected future ination and the current output gap. So the main way in which
the New Keynesian Phillips curve di¤ers from a more traditional neoclassical
Phillips curve is that ination depends on expected future ination (ie Ett+1),
rather than expected current ination (Et 1t).1 This di¤erence has important
implications for monetary policy, since it implies that current ination depends
on the expected present discounted value of future output gaps and cost-push
shocks, so that managing expectations about the future is important for current
ination control. This feature of the model is empirically plausible because there
is substantial evidence that anticipated changes in monetary policy have real
e¤ects (eg Christiano et al. 2005).
The demand side of the model is standard: consumers maximise utility
by choosing asset holdings optimally, giving rise to a Euler equation for each
household. If we aggregate across households we get a single consumption Euler
equation that describes the dynamics of aggregate consumption as a function
of the real interest rate and expected future consumption. Log-linearizing this
equation and imposing the market-clearing condition that consumption equals
output minus government spending, we get the IS curve in the baseline New
Keynesian model:
xt = Etxt+1   (Rt   Ett+1) + gt (2)
where  > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, xt is the output gap,
Rt is the nominal interest rate, and gt is a government spending shock that
follows an AR(1) process.
Like the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the IS curve is forward-looking: it
emphasizes the importance of expectations about the future in the determina-
tion of current outcomes. In particular, the current output gap rises with the
expected future output gap due to consumersdesire to smooth consumption,
and an increase in expected future ination raises the current output gap be-
cause this implies a fall in the real rate of interest (for any given value of the
nominal interest rate).
In addition to the microfounded supply side, an important feature of the
New Keynesian model is that a social loss function in ination and output gap
variations can be derived as an approximation to the utility function of the rep-
resentative household; see, for example, Walsh (2010, Ch. 8.6). Consequently,
social welfare analyses in these models are consistent with the model itself as
1We follow the convention that Et is the mathematical expectations operator conditional
on information available up to and including period t.
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well as being broadly consistent with the stated objectives of real-world cen-
tral banks. The approximate social loss function in the baseline model can be
represented as follows:
Lt = Et
1X
j=0
j(2t+j + x
2
t+j) (3)
where  > 0 is the relative weight on output gap variations, which depends
upon the parameters of the model.
This social loss function has two important roles in the literature. Firstly,
by minimizing Equation (3) subject to (1) and (2) we can derive the rst-order
conditions under optimal policy. These rst-order conditions provide insight into
the main features of e¤ective monetary policymaking and allow us to analyze
the optimal response of policy to shocks that hit economy (see eg Walsh 2010,
Ch. 8.4.3). Second, Equation (3) can be used as a basis for evaluating and
comparing social welfare across alternative monetary policy regimes like IT and
PT as, for example, in Vestin (2006).
The model is closed by introducing an additional equation that pins down
the nominal interest rate Rt. This can be done in two ways. The rst way, which
has been popular in applied literature, is to specify an explicit instrument rule
for the nominal interest rate. The most commonly used rule of this kind is the
Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993):
Rt = ct + cxxt (4)
where c; cx > 0 are the reaction coe¢ cients on ination and the output gap,
respectively; we treat the ination target and steady state interest rate as zero
here and in what follows.
Taylor rules are generally suboptimal ie they do not minimize Equation (3).
Nevertheless, they have become a popular way of modelling monetary policy,
because they are easy to communicate; more robust across alternative models
than optimal policies; and a useful way of describing the behaviour of central
banks in estimated dynamic general equilibrium models.
The second way of closing the model is with an implicit instrument rule.
To implement this approach a particular relationship between the endogenous
variables is assumed to hold and this relationship is then added to the model as
the third equation. For each such feasible relationship there will be an implied
interest rate rule that implements it, but these rules are typically di¢ cult to de-
rive analytically. The interest rate rule itself is therefore usually left unspecied
(hence the label implicit), and the path of the interest rate is instead solved
for numerically.
This approach has been popular in the theoretical literature where researchers
derive rst-order optimality conditions (under commitment or discretion) and
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then study optimal policy by assuming that the central bank sets nominal in-
terest rates at whatever level is consistent with that policy. For example, in the
case of the baseline New Keynesian model under optimal commitment, Evans
and Honkapohja (2006) show that the rst-order optimality condition and the
implied interest rate rule are as follows:
t=  

(xt xt 1) (5)
Rt = c1xt 1 + c2gt + c3ut (6)
where c1; c2 and c3 are complicated functions of the model parameters.
2.2 Calvo contracts and micro-evidence on sticky prices
There is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that prices are sticky in
nominal terms as suggested by the Calvo model. In a seminal paper, Bils and
Klenow (2004) conclude that average price spells in the US last between 3 and 4
months, but subsequent results in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) that exclude
sales prices point to longer price spells of 7 to 11 months a result which is more
consistent with early empirical work on price stickiness in the US. Dhyne et al.
(2006) nd similar results for the Euro Area as part of research conducted by the
Ination Persistence Network at the ECB: the average duration of price spells is
10 to 13 months. Consistent with these ndings, the Calvo reset probability is
typically calibrated to imply average price spells of between 2 and 4 quarters.
The factors responsible for nominal price rigidities remain somewhat of a
mystery, however. Under Calvo price-setting these factors are not modeled:
rms cannot change prices in some periods, and the probability of being able to
change price is independent of the date at which prices were last re-set. Clearly,
these are not realistic assumptions: it must be the case that rms choose to
change prices in some periods and not to do so in others; and rms who have
maintained the same price level for several periods are more likely to change
their prices (ie re-optimize) than those who re-set their price recently. There
is however an important advantage of the simplfying assumptions under Calvo:
they facilitate aggregation by making the model tractable.2 It is also important
to note that the Calvo specication implies that there is a distribution of price
changes across rms as in the data (see eg Bils and Klenow, 2004) that is, some
rms change price more frequently than others. Therefore, the Calvo model
captures some major features of real-world price-setting within an analytically
tractable framework.
Calvo contracts have been criticized in other ways, however, such as the
assumption of a constant reset probability, which cannot explain why prices
2A natural alternative to Calvo price-setting is the Taylor model (Taylor, 1980) of over-
lapping xed-duration price contracts, but this specication is less convenient analytically
because it requires as many groups of price-setters as price-spell durations.
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are reset more frequently in high-ination environments. Several alternative
forms of nominal rigidity have been proposed in the literature, including state-
dependent pricing models (eg Golosov and Lucas, 2007) whereby rms change
prices more frequently when it is more protable to do so; and generalized
Taylor models (Dixon and Le Bihan, 2012) where there are several sectors with
Taylor (1980) contracts of di¤erent durations.3 These alternative models appear
to match the data better in some respects. Nevertheless, the baseline New
Keynesian model with Calvo price-setting assumptions remains the dominant
paradigm in the literature, and it is also the one that has been tested most
extensively.
We may also say the following in defence of the baseline New Keynesian
model. First, although the Calvo model does not provide any theoretical jus-
tication for the stickiness of prices, it is not clear that such a justication is
necessary if our aim to match the dynamics of aggregate macro data. That
is to say, the crucial variable from a macro perspective might be the duration
for which prices are xed (with the reasons being largely irrelevant).4 Second,
even if one were to accept the argument that Calvo contracts do not provide an
adequate approximation to rmspricing behaviour, one is left asking what we
should to do about this. The best approach, in the absence of an alternative
workhorse model that is clearly superior, would presumbly be to proceed as the
current literature has  stressing that our conclusions should be treated with
caution while staying open to the possibility of renements or alternatives that
could t the facts better.
Since there is no clear consensus on an alternative model at the current
time, the argument for moving away from the baseline New Keynesian model
with Calvo price-setting is fairly weak. In fact, as we discuss below, an extended
version of the baseline New Keynesian model provides a suprisingly good t to
the dynamic behaviour of key macro variables in the postwar period and in
particular during the Great Moderation. Having introduced the baseline New
Keynesian model and discussed its main strengths and weaknesses, we now turn
to literature that has used these models to assess the relative merits of PT from
a stabilization perspective.
3 Macro stabilization literature
As Ambler (2009) points out, PT was initially motivated as a way of providing
the economy with long-term price stability. Nevertheless, most of the recent
interest in PT comes from its implications for short run macro stabilization, that
3For a useful discussion of state-dependent pricing models, see Walsh (2010, Ch. 6.2).
4Caplin and Spulber (1987) build a state-dependent pricing model where there is price
stickiness at the rm level but none in the aggregate price level, so that the reasons for price
stickiness are crucial for its aggregate implications. A tractable model of this kind is set out
Lucas and Golosov (2007). However, Costain and Nakov (2011) develop a generalized model
that nests the Calvo model and the Golosov-Lucas model and nd that the best t to micro
pricing data arises when the degree of state dependence is low.
7
is, economic stability at business cycle frequencies. In fact, the recent resurgence
in interest in PT has gone hand-in-hand with the rise in popularity of New
Keynesian models, since there are welfare gains from history dependencein a
forward-looking, rational expectations environment (Woodford, 2003). History
dependence means that monetary policy should respond systematically to past
economic conditions, as well current and expected future economic outcomes.
PT is an example of a history dependent policy because the central bank is
obliged to o¤set past deviations from its target price path. As a result, PT will
tend to produce superior stabilization outcomes to policies such as IT that lack
history dependence.
In this section we discuss the main ndings from the macro stabilization
literature on IT versus PT, as surveyed by Ambler (2009). We then turn to
more recent contributions that shed light on robustness to extensions of the
baseline New Keynesian model. To keep contact with the rapidly-expanding
literature in this area we split the discussion that follows into three subsections:
optimal policy; the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates; and nancial
frictions.
3.1 Optimal policy
In a seminal paper, Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed that the distinction
between discretion and commitment is crucial in rational expectations models.
Under discretion, the policymaker optimizes on a period-by-period basis. As a
result, it cannot make binding promises about the future and must take future
expectations as given. This inability to commit generally leads to suboptimal
outcomes, because policy cannot inuence future expectations and so e¤ectively
has fewer instruments available to achieve its objectives. A classic example of a
suboptimal outcome under discretion is the ination biasproblem highlighted
by Barro and Gordon (1983), whereby an equilibrium with steady-state ination
above the socially-optimal level results from a desire to push output above the
natural rate. An e¢ cient equilbrium outcome can be restored in various ways,
including delegation to a central bank that is more ination-averse than society
(Rogo¤, 1985); one which is subject to punishment via an optimal contract if
the ination target is not met (Walsh, 1995); or delegation to central bank with
a PT mandate (Svensson, 1999).
It is important to note that discretion leads to suboptimal outcomes in dy-
namic models with rational expectations, even if the central bank does not have
an over-ambitious output target (the assumption made in almost all of the recent
literature, and in all the papers we review here). Svensson (1997) and Clarida et
al. (1999) call this phenomenon stabilization biasbecause it implies that the
central banks response to shocks that hit the economy is suboptimal, so that
ination and the output gap deviate from their rst-best outturns. As with the
ination bias, stabilization bias can be eliminated if the central bank can make
a binding commitment over the future path of monetary policy. Stabilization
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bias also implies that delegating monetary policy to a central bank without IT
preferences could potentially improve social outcomes.
3.1.1 Optimal policy under discretion
Svensson (1999) was the rst to formally investigate whether delegating mon-
etary policy to a central bank with a PT mandate could improve stabilization
outcomes under rational expectations. Using a model with a Lucas-type (or
Neoclassical) Phillips curve, he showed that delegating PT preferences to the
central bank delivers a free lunchresult: ination variability is lower for any
given level of output gap variability if output is su¢ ciently persistent.5 In e¤ect,
PT eliminates some of the useless discretion present under IT because the cen-
tral bank is required to undo deviations from its target price path in the future,
so that discretionary behaviour becomes more costly and is curtailed. The cru-
cial distinction is that bygones are bygonesunder IT, whereas PT makes the
objective function of a discretionary policymaker depend in part upon past out-
comes, so that discretion carries a penalty which is absent under IT. Although
Svenssons model features rational expectations, it is subject to two important
limitations. First, the economy is described by a Phillips curve which performs
poorly from an empirical perspective because it implies that only unanticipated
changes in policy have real e¤ects. Second, the social loss function Svensson
uses is ad hoc in the sense that it cannot be derived from the utility function of
a representative agent. As noted in Section 2.1, the New Keynesian model can
address both these criticisms.
Vestin (2006) assesses the performance of PT in the baseline New Keynesian
model. He shows that the free lunch result remains intact. Intuitively, since
rms in New Keynesian models set current prices as a function of expected future
prices, the extent to which current prices rise in response to an inationary shock
depends upon the impact of policy upon expectations about future ination.
Under IT, ination expectations are e¤ectively xed on the ination target
because bygones are bygones. Under PT, by contrast, rms expect a rise in
current prices to be followed by a contraction in demand and lower future prices,
in order to return the price level to its target path. As a result, rms raise their
prices less in response to inationary (ie cost-push) shocks under a PT regime,
implying lower ination variability for any given level of output gap variability.
The free lunch result is also robust to indexation to past ination in periods
when prices-setters are unable to reoptimize, except in the special case of full
indexation (Röisland, 2006; Gaspar et al. 2007). Indexing prices to past ination
gives rise to the so-called hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curvewhere ination
is additionally related to lagged ination:
t   t 1 = Et(t+1   t) + xt + ut (7)
5PT dominates IT if the degree of endogenous persistence in the output gap exceeds 1/2.
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where 0    1 represents the degree of indexation to past ination, and
t   t 1 is the quasi-di¤erencein ination.
Although this specication performs better empirically than the standard
New Keynesian Phillips curve, it is di¢ cult to justify from a theoretical perspec-
tive because price-setters index in a purely backward-looking manner. Moreover,
Steinsson (2003) shows that one can also justify a partially backward-looking
New Keynesian Phillips curve by assuming that a fraction of price-setters are
non-rational and follow a simple rule-of-thumb when setting prices, but in this
case optimal policy implies base-level drift in the price level. Nevertheless, the
numerical results in Nessén and Vestin (2005) suggest that PT will continue
to dominate IT in welfare terms as long as the fraction of rule-of-thumb price-
setters in the population is smaller than the fraction of rational price-setters.6
Blake et al. (2011) tackle a somewhat di¤erent issue that arises under discre-
tion. Since there are multiple rational expectations equilibria under discretion
when the baseline New Keynesian model is augmented with capital accumu-
lation (Blake and Kirsanova, 2012), they demonstrate that IT can potentially
outperform PT under discretion in these models, because the lowest welfare
equilibrium under delgation to a PT central bank may be inferior to the high-
est welfare equilbrium attainable under IT. Consequently, it is generally not
possible to predict whether PT will outperform IT in welfare terms at least
in the absence of a mechanism for selecting one equilibrium over another.7 Fi-
nally, Masson and Shukayev (2012) show that if the central bank operates under
discretion and the public believes that there is possibility it will rebase the price-
level target in response to large shocks, there can be multiple equilbria under
PT even in the absence of capital accumulation. As a result, the economy could
end up in a low credibility PT equilibrium (ie one with a high probability of
rebasing) where output volatility is increased and the benecial e¤ects of PT
are reduced or even reversed.
3.1.2 Optimal policy under commitment
The standard argument made in favour of discretion is that, in practice, no
major central bank makes any kind of binding commitment over the course of its
future monetary policy(Clarida et al. 1999, p. 1671). It is far from obvious,
however, that discretion provides a better description of the real-world behavior
of central banks than commitment even to those who have had considerable
6The discrepancy between the results in Steinsson (2003) and those in Röisland (2006)
and Gaspar et al. (2007) arises because the social loss function di¤ers in the two models. In
the latter case the loss function remains as in Equation (3), except that the squared term
in ination is replaced with a squared term in the quasi-di¤erence of ination (see Roisland,
2006). In the former case analysed by Steinsson (2003), the relative weights in the loss function
change and there are additional squared terms in the lagged output gap and the change in
ination rate.
7Blake et al. do not address the issue of whether welfare-superior equilibria could be
selected under certain delegation schemes in their paper.
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input in the policy process (see eg Blinder, 1997). Indeed, commitment may well
provide a better description of the behavior of central banks because it rules
out systematic policy mistakes which are repeated ad innitum under discretion.
Moreover, as is now familiar in the context of formal foward guidance, real-
world central banks do commit to contingent rules in which there are binding
forward targets for ination and output; and, as in our theoretical models, these
rules commit the central bank except in respect of its contemporary response to
shocks. Commitment solutions are also helpful because they provide guidance on
the optimal conduct of monetary policy, which adds to our understanding of why
some monetary policies perform better than others. Consequently, many papers
in the literature have used commitment to shed light on the relative merits of
PT from a stabilization perspective. This commitment-based literature has
two di¤erent strands: the rst focuses on the features of optimal policy under
commitment; the second considers the performance of simple Taylor-type rules.
Optimal commitment One well-known result from the rst strand of litera-
ture is that, in the standard New Keynesian model, optimal commitment implies
price stationarity and history dependence (Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2003).
As emphasised by Vestin (2006), both of these features are consistent with a
PT regime.8 By contrast, an IT regime is inconsistent with price stationarity
because it implies base-level drift in the price level in response to inationary
shocks; and it lacks history dependence because bygones are bygones.As dis-
cussed by Woodford (2000), history dependence is a robust feature of optimal
policy in forward-looking models. However, recent research has shown that the
price stationarity result is not robust to minor modications of the baseline New
Keynesian model. For instance, Steinsson (2003) shows that base-level drift in
the price level is optimal under commitment if one makes the additional as-
sumption that some fraction of price-setters are backward-looking and follow a
simple rule-of-thumb when setting prices. More recently, Levin et al. (2010)
show that optimal policy involves considerable base-level drift in response to
contractionary demand shocks when the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates is an occasionally-binding constraint.
Even in the absence of the zero lower bound, the price stationarity result is
rather fragile. Amano et al. (2012) show that base-level drift is in fact opti-
mal in the standard New Keynesian model if the central bank and agents must
make decisions before current shocks to the economy are observed. Intuitively,
the benets of price stationarity in the standard model come from the expec-
tation that policy will o¤set inationary shocks, which in turn dampens the
impact of shocks on current ination. But if the central bank cannot observe
current shocks to ination, it cannot react directly to these shocks and so can-
not inuence price-settersexpectations in a favourable way. The benets of
8We can conceive of cases where history dependence could be destabilizing and move the
economy further away from the optimal commitment solution. However, Vestin (2006) shows
that the history dependence introduced by PT is benecial from a welfare perspective. For
example, he shows that PT can exactly replicate the optimal commitment policy in the baseline
New Keynesian model when there is no persistence in the cost-push shock ut.
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price stationarity are therefore lost and it becomes optimal to treat inationary
shocks as bygones.
A second example is provided by Gerberding et al. (2012), who consider
a two-sector extension of the benchmark New Keynesian model with nominal
rigidities in both the intermediate goods sector and the nal goods sector. They
show that price-level stationarity can be very costly in such an environment
because optimal commitment implies substantial base-level drift in both sectors,
and extending the target horizon under PT lowers but does not eliminate these
welfare costs.9 Intuitively, PT performs poorly in this environment because
the price-level target relates to the price level in the nal goods sector, which
implies that the central bank must accept strong output uctuations and a
suboptimally high degree of base-level drift in the intermediate goods sector to
return the price level of nal goods to target at the appropriate horizon.
Commitment to Taylor rules The second strand of commitment literature
has assessed the performance of IT and PT Taylor-type rules in New Keynesian
models. Simple interest rate rules are motivated by the argument that they
may provide a better representation of the behavior of real-world central banks,
since they are easy to communicate; more robust across alternative models than
fully optimal policies (see eg Taylor, 1999); and easier to implement as they do
not imply a policy response to economic shocks which cannot be easily observed
see Equation (6) above and Equation (3.6) of Clarida et al. (1999).
Whereas IT Taylor rules relate the nominal interest rate to a measure of the
output gap and ination (like the original Taylor rule), PT Taylor rules respond
to a price-level gap rather than the ination gap:10
Rt = cp(pt   pt ) + cxxt (8)
where cp; cx > 0 are reaction coe¢ cients, pt is the log of the aggregate price
level and pt is the target price level.
The Taylor rule literature contains several analyses of PT in open economies.
An early contribution to this literature was Batini and Yates (2003). They show
that the degree of openness of an economy is generally important for compar-
isons of IT and PT. In their model the real exchange rate enters the Phillips
curve, so that the variability of ination depends on uctuations in the real
exchange rate, with this channel becoming more important as the degree of
openness of the economy is increased. On the one hand, PT can have a positive
impact on ination stabilization because the uncovered interest parity (UIP)
9Formally, the target horizon is the number of periods in which the price level must be
returned to target.
10When comparing across regimes using Taylor rules, the reaction coe¢ cients are typically
chosen to minimize the social loss function. In addition, some papers in the literature allow
for interest rate smoothing through dependence of the nominal interest rate on its lagged
value, Rt 1.
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condition introduces an additional channel through which managing expecta-
tions matters for economic outcomes. On the other hand, PT could lead to a
deterioration in stabilization relative to IT, because it makes interest rates some-
what more volatile, and this feeds back to greater real exchange rate volatility
by the UIP condition. In ranking IT and PT regimes in welfare terms, it is the
relative size of these two e¤ects that is important.
Much of the subsequent research in this literature has been carried out by
or in conjunction with the Bank of Canada. For instance, Coletti et al. (2008)
compared IT and PT in the two-country IMF Global Economy Model (GEM),
a medium-scale DSGE model designed to enable open-economy issues to be
investigated within a representative-agent framework suitable for policy analysis
(see Laxton, 2008). This model contains several sources of nominal rigidity and
is forward-looking; it can therefore be viewed as an extension of the baseline
New Keynesian model. Coletti et al. calibrated the model for Canada with
the US as the second country, giving the BoC-GEM model. They found that
a PT Taylor rule outperforms an IT one in terms of ination and output gap
volatility, primarily because shocks to the terms of trade strengthen the case for
PT due to its role as a nominal anchor that stabilises the domestic price level.
Dib et al. (2008) investigated the impact of PT within a medium-scale open
economy New Keynesian model whose parameters are estimated on Canadian
data. The model is augmented with credit frictions as in Bernanke et al. (1999),
and entrepreneurs enter into one-period nominal debt contracts in order to -
nance investment. In this model, PT lowers the distortion in the economy due
to nominal debt contracts, because ination expectations are better stabilized
than under IT. Real risk faced by entrepreneurs is therefore reduced, so that
resources are allocated more e¢ ciently, and this increase in e¢ ciency means
that nominal interest rates need not need to vary as much in order to minimize
the standard welfare loss associated with nominal price rigidity, so that the real
interest rate volatility is also reduced. PT also tends to outperform IT in small
open economies with multiple sectors which are subject to sector-specic terms
of trade shocks, because the gains from PT due to extra stabilization through
the expectations channel outweigh the losses involved in responding to addi-
tional shocks so as to stabilize the aggreagate price level (see Murchison, 2010
for a brief review).
In summary, when monetary policy commits to Taylor-type rules, PT tends
to dominate IT in several di¤erent variants of open economy New Keynesian
models. Hence, the main results highlighted by Giannoni (2010) in the context
of the baseline (closed-economy) New Keynesian model namely that PT Taylor
rules outperform IT ones in welfare terms and are more robust largely appear
to carry over to richer models.11 By contrast, optimal commitment results in
favour of PT appear to be rather fragile to minor modcations of the baseline
11 It is important to note however that dominance of PT over IT is not a necessary outcome
when policymakers commit to Taylor-type rules. For example, a recent working paper by
Coletti et al. (2012) which considers an extended version of the BoC-GEM model with sepa-
rate energy and non-energy sectors nds that the impact of PT is ambiguous. PT improves
13
model. We argue, however, that it is the former case that is of most relevance
for real-world central banks, because fully-optimal policies do not perform well
across a range of alternative models of the economy and are more di¢ cult to
implement in practice. We return to the argument that PT Taylor rules will
tend to dominate IT Taylor rules after discussing whether this result also occurs
in the presence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and nancial
market frictions.
3.2 The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (ZLB)
In simple terms, the ZLB states that nominal interest rates cannot fall below
zero in an economy where money is untaxed and can be stored without cost.
If it did, so the argument goes, rational agents would have no incentive to
hold nominal government debt, because it would be dominated by money, a
liquid asset with a xed nominal return of zero. Aided by recent advances in
computing power, the macro stabilization literature has incorporated the ZLB
into New Keynesian models as an occasionally-binding constraint, that is, a
constraint of the form:12
Rt 0; 8t (9)
In these analyses, economic agents take the ZLB into account when forming
expectations about the future course of monetary policy, and the ZLB binds
only a small fraction of the time usually between zero and 10 per cent of all
simulated periods. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) was the seminal contribu-
tion in this literature. They introduce the ZLB constraint into the baseline New
Keynesian model and solve for the optimal commitment policy. In addition,
they also evaluate the performance of various monetary policies at the ZLB
using numerical analysis. Eggertsson and Woodfords most important ndings
were as follows.
First, the optimal commitment policy with a ZLB takes the form of a state-
contingent PT targeting rule where the target price level is updated every period
based upon the previous period target shortfall. Intuitively, the optimal policy
includes a state-contingent target price level so that ination expectations re-
ceive extra stimulus at times when deationary pressure is greatest; in turn, this
implies that real interest rates are lowered sharply as a ZLB episode worsens,
boosting output. Since this policy implies a state-contingent price level at times
when the ZLB is binding (ie at times when the target shortfall is non-zero), it
in fact implies base-level drift in response to shocks. Consequently, the opti-
mal commitment policy with the ZLB contains features of both IT and PT, in
contrast to the baseline New Keynesian model.
Second, Eggertsson and Woodford show that the state-contingent optimal
policy which would probably be di¢ cult to implement in practice  can be
stabilization in the case of non-energy commodity supply shocks, but IT does slightly better in
response to energy commodity supply shocks, as well as producing somewhat better outcomes
in response to commodity demand shocks.
12For a review of early studies on the zero lower bound, see Yates (2004).
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approximated well by a simple interest rate rule that aims at a xed target price
level (implying zero base-level drift), while a standard IT-type interest rate rule
performs very poorly by comparison. The key to this result is that under IT,
the real interest rate does not respond to the severity of a ZLB episode, because
ination expectations are xed on a constant ination target. Under the PT
rule, by contrast, the real interest rate falls as the severity of ZLB episodes
worsens, because agents rationally expect future ination to return the price
level to target. This stimulus to the output gap from lower real interest rates
aids the economys recovery from the ZLB.
Formal welfare analyses of optimal policy at the ZLB have been conducted
by Adam and Billi (2006, 2007) and Nakov (2008). The model in Adam and Billi
(2006) follows Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) but they calibrate the model to
US data using shocks from the Great Moderation period. In order to evaluate
social welfare, these shocks are used to simulate the model, which is solved us-
ing numerical methods. They nd that zero nominal interest rates occur rather
infrequently under the optimal commitment policy only about one quarter in
every 17 years, or an unconditional probability of 1.5 per cent. As a result, the
additional welfare loss due to the ZLB is quite small at approximately one per
cent of the welfare loss generated by sticky prices alone, though this estimate is
quite sensitive on the upside to the variance of innovations to the natural rate
of interest. Adam and Billi (2007) extend the analysis of optimal policy in the
baseline New Keynesian model to the case of discretion. They nd that the
welfare losses imposed by discretion relative to optimal commitment increase
by around two-thirds when the ZLB is an occassionally-binding constraint, sug-
gesting that the potential welfare gains from well-designed alternatives to IT
are likely be somewhat larger when one accounts for the ZLB in New Keynesian
models.
Nakov (2008) takes up this theme. His contribution is to assess social wel-
fare for a variety of zero-truncated Taylor-type interest rate rules, which he
argues provide a more plausible representation of real-world monetary policy
than optimal policies. Using the standard New Keynesian model, he assesses
the performance of IT and PT Taylor rules. All the rules perform poorly relative
to optimal commitment: the social losses for the PT and IT Taylor rules are
800 and 1400 per cent respectively, with the loss under IT being much larger
if interest rate smoothing is not permitted. On some level this nding is not
surprising: Taylor rules rarely perform well in individual models of the economy
but have the advantage of robustness across models (Taylor, 1999). Crucially,
however, constraining the IT-PT comparison to simple Taylor-type rules leaves
intact the conclusion that PT is benecial in the presence of the ZLB.
Finally, an important recent contribution to the ZLB literature is Coibion
et al. (2012). They focus on a New Keynesian model with an occasionally-
binding ZLB and simple Taylor-type rules. Crucially, they allow for a positive
steady-state rate of ination around which the model is log-linearized, so that
they can study the optimal rate of ination in the presence of the ZLB. Under
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IT, moderate trend ination is optimal in order to reduce the probability of
hitting the ZLB and the welfare losses associated with this. The welfare gains
of PT are magnied relative to the case where steady-state ination is not
optimized, because the likelihood of the ZLB being reached is much lower for
any given steady-state ination rate under a PT regime than an IT one. As
a result, the welfare benets of lowering steady-state ination can be realized
while maintaining a low frequency of ZLB episodes. The potential welfare gains
from PT through this channel are quantitatively quite signicant: raising the
response to the price level in the Taylor rule from zero to 1/4 implies a welfare
gain equivalent to a permanent increase in aggregate consumption of 0.5 per
cent.13 This nding, and the results of Nakov (2008), are further examples of
PT dominating IT when policymakers commit to simple Taylor-type rules.
3.3 Financial frictions
An issue brought to the fore by the recent nancial crisis is the potential impor-
tance of nancial market imperfections for the operation of the macroeconomy.
Covas and Zhang (2010) focus on the implications of nancial market imperfec-
tions for comparisons of IT and PT. To do so, they compare IT and PT in a New
Keynesian model augmented with nancial market imperfections in both debt
and equity markets. The structural parameters of the model are estimated for
the Canadian economy. They nd that PT outperforms IT in terms of stabiliza-
tion because the expectations channel means that ination is better anchored
under PT, so that it is less costly for the central bank to address nancial mar-
ket distortions through monetary policy. It should be noted, though, that the
benets of PT are smaller in the presence of nancial market imperfections and
fall as the importance of nancial market frictions is strengthened.
Bailliu et al. (2012) study the interaction between macroprudential rules and
monetary policy in a model with nancial market imperfections. As in Covas
and Zhang (2010), nancial frictions are introduced through debt contracts à la
Bernanke et al. (1999), implying an inverse relationship between the external
nance premium and rm net worth. The model is estimated on Canadian
data and calibrated accordingly. Under optimised IT and PT Taylor rules, it
is benecial to respond to nancial imbalances in both a Taylor rule and a
macroprudential rule. Nevertheless, PT rules still delivers substantial relative
welfare gains relative to IT because it is history dependent. These results provide
additional conrmation that augmenting New Keynesian models with nancial
frictions does not substantially alter the relative performance of IT and PT
regimes, as well as additional evidence that PT tends to dominate IT when
policymakers commit to simple to Taylor-type rules.
13Positive trend ination has three distinct costs in New Keynesian models; see Ambler
(2007) for a discussion. The traditional welfare cost of ination due to ination acting as
a tax of money holdings (see Bailey, 1956) is not one of them. It is therefore conceivable
that the welfare gains attainable from lowering trend ination under PT could be larger than
estimated by Coibion et al. (2012).
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Lastly, Dib et al. (2013) also nd that PT Taylor rules outperform IT
ones. They consider the same model as in Dib et al. (2008)  ie a medium-
scale open economy New Keynesian model augmented with credit frictions as
in Bernanke et al. (1999), entrepreneurs who enter into one-period nominal
debt contracts to nance investment, and nancial shocks. The parameters of
the model are estimated on Canadian data. The main nding is that a PT
Taylor rule outperforms an IT Taylor rule in welfare terms when the Taylor
rule is extended to include a response to the external nance premium and
regardless of whether interest rate smoothing is permitted or not. The key to this
result is that the welfare costs of the nominal debt distortion are linked to real
interest rate variability, which is reduced under PT because large movements in
nominal interest rates are not necessary to stabilize the economy due to history
dependence. Consequently, introducing nominal debt contracts and nancial
shocks strengthens the case for PT.
3.4 Summary
A key nding from the macro stabilization literature is that PT has benecial
e¤ects in New Keynesian models. These microfounded models have become the
workhorse for monetary policy analysis in recent years. In these models, optimal
policy implies price stationarity and history dependence key features of a PT
regime. Although the optimality of price stationarity is not robust to minor
modications of the baseline New Keynesian model and history dependence need
not guarantee that PT dominates IT, when monetary policymakers commit to
simple Taylor-type interest rate rules, PT consistently outperforms IT in welfare
terms. This result is robust in the sense that it holds for several extensions of the
baseline New Keynesian model, including open economies, the zero lower bound,
and nancial market imperfections.14 The benecial e¤ects of PT therefore
appear to hang on the joint hypothesis that agents are rational and the economy
New Keynesian. Accordingly, we focus below on empirical evidence on rational
expectations and the performance of New Keynesian models.
4 Survey and experimental evidence on rational
expectations
As our discussion above makes clear, the stabilizing properties of expecta-
tions under PT hang on the assumption that the regime is fully understood
by forward-looking agents with up-to-date information ie the rational expec-
tations assumption. It is therefore crucial to test this scientically. Broadly
speaking, evidence on rational expectations has come from two lines of enquiry:
studies investigating the empirical performance of aggregate macro models with
14This appears to be the case because  unlike price stationarity  history dependence
is a robust feature of optimal policy in New Keynesian models. See Giannoni (2010) for a
discussion of history dependence in the context and IT and PT Taylor rules.
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rational expectations; and surveys and experiments. We consider the second
line of enquiry in this section.
4.1 Survey evidence on rational expectations
Surveys are a popular way of testing the rational expectations assumption. At
an intuitive level this popularity is hardly surprising: surveys give researchers
the freedom to ask the right questionwhile also enabling them to collect ex-
pectations data at the micro level at which household decisions are taken. Tests
of rational expectations using individual-level survey data can also avoid bi-
ases that arise from aggregation or pooling of forecast data, as in the case of
consensus forecasts (see Bonham and Cohen, 2001).
Some well-known surveys are the Livingston Series in the US and the Con-
federation of British Industry survey in the UK (see Carlson and Parkin, 1975).
Early studies using data from these surveys concluded that expectations are not
strictly rational, because they do not satisfy the e¢ ciency property: informa-
tion available to survey participants was not independent of expectation errors,
though some studies in the literature were not able to reject e¢ ciency conclu-
sively (see Holden et al. 1985, Ch. 3). However, there are some well-known
di¢ culties with the survey approach. In markets the expectations that matter
are those of the active market participants and surveys may not identify these
people: they question people who may not be active. This in turn means that
survey respondents may be inattentive and poorly informed. Other potential
problems include truthfulness and accurate recall.
In addition, an important recent contribution to the survey literature is made
by Andolfatto et al. (2008). They show that when the true data-generating
process (DGP) is a DSGE model with switches in monetary policy regime and
agents who form expectations rationally using the Kalman lter, standard re-
gressions of the kind used in the survey literature on ination expectations will
incorrectly reject the rational expectations hypothesis. This nding suggests
that several recent papers reporting biased ination expectations eg Thomas
et al. (1999) and Mankiw et al. (2003) cannot be interpreted as conclusive
statistical evidence against rational expectations.15 In short, the problem is that
these papers are subject to small-sample bias which is exacerbated if short run
learning dynamics are generated by shifts in monetary policy regime. Given this
and the other potential problems with surveys outlined above, it is important
to bring other sources of evidence to bear on whether expectations are rational.
4.2 Experimental evidence on rational expectations
An alternative approach to surveys that has gained popularity in recent years
is experimental economics. Like surveys, experiments are exible and can be
targeted at individuals. The main advantage of the experimental approach is
15 In particular, these papers report evidence that ination expectations in the data are not
mean unbiased, implying that forecast errors are serially correlated.
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that the behaviour of participants can be studied within a particular economic
context chosen by the researcher. Consequently, this approach has been widely
used in the microeconometric literature to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of proposed
policy interventions, though more sparingly in macroeconomics (see Angrist and
Pischke, 2010). An early contribution to the literature was Smith et al. (1988).
They study spot asset trading in an experimental environment and conclude
that tradersexpectations converge upon rational expectations as they acquire
additional experience; in their model this eventually leads to speculative bubbles
being ruled out. However, the ndings of other studies in the literature are
generally more mixed. For instance, Bloomeld and Hales (2002) found that
experimental subjects who were told that the data-generating process was a
random walk did not have static expectations, the rational expectations solution
in this case. Their beliefs were instead consistent with switches between a
trending regime and a mean-reverting one.
In relation to the IT-PT debate, Amano et al. (2011) investigated whether
experiment participants were able to accurately forecast ination in a simulated
PT monetary policy regime. They found that participantsforecasts did adjust
under PT, but not to the extent that the implications of targeting the price level
were fully reected in their expectations. It is important to note, however, that
these ndings were obtained under conditions relatively unfavourable to PT:
participants were given minimal information about the model economy and had
the shift in monetary policy regime explained to them only once. It seems likely
that agentsexpectations would take account of the implications of PT more
fully if they had more information about the economy or ongoing communication
explaining the new regime, though it is not clear whether such a strategy would
close the gap completely. It is also worth pointing out that ination was forecast
at the individual level in the study, yet in practice many economic decisions are
taken at the level of the household. Since the more well-informed agents in the
household will presumably take responsibility for economic decisions, focusing
on understanding of PT at the individual level may understate the true level of
public understanding. Indeed, as we argue below, market outcomes are likely
to be dominated by the actions of well-informed agents, regardless of whether
we are considering individuals or household units.
One weakness of the experimental literature is that it is subject to some of
the same criticisms as surveys: subjects may deliberately alter their behaviour
under experimental conditions; and experiments cannot identify active market
participants unless they are aimed at a specic group, which in turn may reduce
the extent to which they can shed light on macroeconomic issues. It is also well-
known that experimental outcomes are highly sensitive to the rules of the game,
a point highlighted by John List in a series of papers. Lastly, the usefulness of
experiments in addressing macro issues is likely to be limited by the cost of
large-scale experiments and the fact that it is important but di¢ cult to provide
experimental participants with the same ow of information that they would
have access to outside of an experimental environment. Given the potential
problems with surveys and experiments, we believe that it is preferable to test
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macro theories at the aggregate level using macro data when such results can
be established on strong statistical grounds.
5 Testing the models used in evaluating price-
level targeting
When as here we are concerned with the macro implications of a new policy
regime, it is preferable to test our macro models of policy on macro data. This
approach in itself is not new but we proceed, after a brief review of the current
literature, to a discussion of more recent developments that have moved the
literature in the direction of statistically testing the restrictions implied by New
Keynesian models where consumers and rms have rational expectations.
5.1 The empirical performance of macroeconomic models
Following the rational expectations revolution of the 1970s, macroeconomic
models with rational expectations became commonplace, yet few formal at-
tempts were made to test these expectations against alternative expectational
assumptions. Fair (1993) is an early exception. He sets up a model of the econ-
omy which nests both rational and adaptive expectations, making a direct test
of the rational expectations hypothesis possible. The estimated equations come
from a medium-scale macro model augmented with current and lagged values of
macro variables which are considered potential determinants of the dependent
variables, as well as future expected values based on current information. The
test of rational expectations then amounts to a test of the joint signicance of
the coe¢ cients on the forward-looking variables. In total, this test is conducted
for 16 separate equations, including 7 describing the behaviour of the household
sector, 5 describing the behaviour of rms, and additional equations for invest-
ment, employment, interest rates, and asset prices. Each equation is estimated
using quarterly data over the period 1954 to 1986.
The results show some support for the rational expectations hypothesis. In
particular, 8 of the 16 equations estimated have signicant lead coe¢ cients at
the 1% level for at least one of four alternative tests for each equation, with
the strongest support coming from the 7 household equations, of which 5 are
statistically signicant. In the other 8 cases, however, the null hypothesis of
adaptive expectations is not rejected. This testing procedure is not without
problems, though, as recent research has highlighted. One important problem is
that the model solution for the forward expectations of ination will importantly
include lagged ination; hence it is unclear that the tests have much power or
indeed that the relevant equations are identied. To give a pertient example, it
is widely recognized that equations with lagged ination may be equivalent to
the solution of those with future expectations.16 A second problem is that the
16For example, the solution for ination under commitment in the baseline New Keynesian
model is t = t 1+ut (Clarida et al. 1999, p. 1704). Hence Ett+1 = t+Etut+1
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test is a partial information test: each equation is tested on a piecewise basis, so
there is no unambiguous accept/reject decision for the model as a whole. More
importantly, this means that the cross-equation restrictions implied by rational
expectations are left untested. More recent literature that we discuss below has
overcome these weaknesses by using full-information methods. A nal weakness
of the test conducted by Fair (1993) is that it is vulnerable to the Lucas critique
of policy evaluation (Lucas, 1976). In particular, the model is not derived from
rst-order conditions for households and rms and so does not contain deep
parametersthat can be expected to be invariant to structural change; nor is
the set of equations chosen for testing disciplined by rigorous microfoundations.
In order to address these concerns, macroeconomic models are now built,
as standard, from models of the economy with market clearing and optimizing
households and rms with rational expectations. These micro-founded dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models were popularized by the pioneer-
ing contribution of Kydland and Prescott (1982), who showed that, in such a
model, technological shocks alone could account for a surprisingly large fraction
of US output volatility. Indeed, as Fernández-Villaverde (2010, p. 4) observes,
the amazing feature was how well the model did despite having so little of
what was traditionally thought of as the necessary ingredients of business cycle
theories: money, nominal rigidities, or non-market clearing.Since Kydland and
Prescotts 1982 paper, researchers have augmented real business cycle models
with New Keynesian nominal rigidities in order to provide a plausible stabi-
lization role for monetary policy. These models do a good job of matching
several key features of aggregate data when hit with both real and nominal
shocks, as we explain below. It is this combination of theoretical foundations
and empirical performance that has made New Keynesian models popular in
the macroeconomic stabilization literature discussed in Section 3.
An important contribution to the applied New Keynesian literature was
Christiano et al. (2005). They set up a medium-scale New Keynesian model
with staggered wage contracts, variable capacity utilization, investment adjust-
ment costs, and indexation of prices and wages to past ination. The model
parameters were estimated on quarterly U.S. data over the postwar period us-
ing Bayesian methods. The estimated model was able to replicate the dynamic
patterns of the impulse response functions of several important macroeconomic
aggregates in response to monetary policy shocks (i.e. an unexpected fall in
the Federal Funds rate), as estimated using a vector autoregression (VAR). In
particular, the model does a good job of accounting quantitatively for the im-
pulse responses of ination, output and the real wage, as well as the lagged,
hump-shaped responses of consumption, investment, prots and labour produc-
tivity in the data. Therefore, augmenting the New Keynesian model with real
and nominal frictions enables it to mimic the dynamic responses of several key
variables to nominal shocks. Smets and Wouters (2007) go even further. They
show that a Bayesian-estimated New Keynesian model with several sources of
is a function of t 1. Similar arguments apply to the output gap solution.
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real and nominal rigidities and 7 orthogonal shocks can match several addi-
tional dynamic features of U.S. data, and that the model as a whole performs
well in out-of-sample forecast tests. More specically, the estimated model does
as well as a BVAR(4) in terms of out-of-sample forecast performance using the
marginal likelihood criterion; and a more traditional out-of-sample forecasting
exercise shows that the model performs comparably to a BVAR(4) over short
horizons up to one year, and considerably better at longer horizons such as 2 or
3 years.
Some recent papers have considered renements of rational expectations in
medium-scale New Keynesian models in the spirit of Christiano et al. (2005) and
Smets and Wouters (2007). Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) show how one can
model newsin a DSGE framework, that is, the arrival of information on future
shocks prior to the time when those shocks are actually realized. Fujiwara et al.
(2011) and Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) estimate medium-scale DSGE models
with news shocks and sticky prices and wages. Fujiwara et al. (2011) nd that
the inclusion of news shocks signicantly improves the t of the New Keynesian
model in the case of the US economy but not Japan; and Khan and Tsoukalas
(2011) show that the importance of news shocks is sensitive to model structure,
shocks, and the data used in estimation making it hard to draw any general
conclusions about the contribution of news shocks to business cycles. Alternative
renements to rational expectations that have had some success empirically
include narrowing the information set of agents (ie imperfect information) as in
Levine et al. (2012); sticky informationas in Mankiw and Reis (2002); and
constraints on information ow due to rational inattentionas in Mackowiak
and Wiederholt (2011).17 The main attraction of these approaches is that they
can help New Keynesian models to match inertia in the data without the need
for features such as price indexation and habit formation whose empirical basis is
questionable. These other approaches have not yet been shown to convincingly
outperform standard models with fully rational expectations, but they are a
promising avenue for future research.18
In summary, New Keynesian models seem to do a reasonably good job of
matching dynamic features of aggregate macro data as summarized by VARs,
17 In addition, some recent papers have considered more drastic deviations from rational
expectations such as behavioral expectations (as we discuss below) and adaptive learning
(Evans and Honkapohja, 2001; Slobodyan and Wouters, 2012). See Milani (forthcoming) for
a survey of approaches to modeling expectations in DSGE models.
18Levine et al. (2012) estimate an NK model that nests rational expectations and behavioral
expectations using Bayesian methods. They nd that the composite (partly behavioral)
expectations model outperforms the model with rational expectations, in contrast to the
results we present in Section 5.4 based on the method of indirect inference. However, as they
note (p. 1298), a limitation of the likelihood race methodology is that the assessment of model
t is only relative to its other rivals with di¤erent restrictions. The outperforming model in
the space of competing models may still be poor (potentially misspecied) in capturing the
important dynamics in the data.It is simply not clear what one is to conclude from a relative
ranking of models, if all of them are rejected by the data behaviour (as may be the case here).
An advantage of indirect inference is that it provides both a relative ranking of di¤erent models
and an absolute test of whether any particular model is rejected by the data.
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and the literature has recently considered renements to rational expectations
that could improve the t of these models in future. The next logical step is to
test models with rational expectations against the data using formal statistical
tests that accept or reject the baseline model and variants of it. Such tests should
narrow down the set of models that need to be considered in future research by
rejecting particular models (or variants) that clearly cannot match the data. As
we discuss below, this challenge has been taken on by a recent strand of applied
macro literature that exploits the use of VARs as a description of the time-series
properties of aggregate macro data. In light of the promising results dicussed
above, this recent literature has focused on New Keynesian DSGE models.
5.2 Testing DSGE models: indirect inference
Indirect inference is a simulation-based method used for estimating or evalu-
ating economic models. Its distinguishing feature is the use of an auxiliary
modelwhich need not be correctly specied  to represent the time series
properties in the data. Estimation and evaluation are then based upon the aux-
iliary model, which acts as a criterion function that selects important features
in the data; this is the sense in which inference is indirect. Indirect inference
has most commonly been used to estimate structural economic models (Smith,
1993; Gourieoux and Monfort, 1996). An important advantage of this approach
is that estimation is possible when the likelihood function is di¢ cult to evalu-
ate or analytically cumbersome (Canova, 2007). Indeed, indirect inference can
be used to estimate almost any economic model from which data can be simu-
lated. Indirect inference basically chooses the parameters of the macroeconomic
model so that, from the point of the view of the auxiliary model, the actual
and simulated data look similar. In this respect, researchers can use indirect
inference to focus upon matching those aspects in the data which they view as
most important. The extension of indirect inference to the case of evaluating
macroeconomic models is discussed in detail below, as this our main focus in
this section.
It is worth mentioning at this point that there have been well-known prob-
lems with evaluating DSGE models of the economy. Hansen and Heckman
(1996) raised two problems which are relevant for our discussion here. The rst
is that calibrating macroeconomic models is not a well-dened scientic proce-
dure: researchers can end up calibrating the same models with very di¤erent
parameters based upon their interpretation of the empirical literature. The sec-
ond issue relates to the way that the empirical performance of these models is
evaluated typically, a small (but not precisely dened) set of simulated mo-
ments was to be compared informally with the same moments in the data to
judge whether the model was a success. As should be clear from the discus-
sion of the previous section, the most inuential papers in the recent literature
are those which have responded to the rst challenge hands-on by estimating
macro models on the data using full-information methods. The second issue
raised by Hansen and Heckman is very much alive today, however. In fact, as
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noted above, the time series properties of estimated DSGE models are com-
monly compared to alternative representations such as reduced form VARs (or
their implied impluse response functions) in much the same way that the busi-
ness cycle moments of early DSGE models were subjectively compared with the
business cycle moments in the data. Something stronger is needed to choose
between alternative models of the economy a formal statistical test that will
accept or reject the theory. The method of indirect inference provides such a
test.
Indirect inference can be used to test whether a DSGE model can simulate
behaviour that is likethe behaviour in the data, where the data behaviour is
summarised by the reduced form representation of some unknown true model,
or an approximation to it. Typically, the reduced form approximation is a VAR
or a VECM.19 Then the question is whether the structural DSGE macro model
could have been the generating mechanism of these coe¢ cients. We can answer
this question by simulating the DSGE model over the same data period with
repeated samples of its own errors these samples will give us pseudo-histories
that the model was capable of creating, and we can then ask whether the actual
history (as captured by its estimated reduced form coe¢ cients) could have been
one of these histories.
To formalize this intuition, it is worth briey considering the indirect in-
ference testing procedure. The method works as follows. Suppose we have a
DSGE model with a xed vector of structural parameters  which can be taken
as given, having been reached either by estimation or calibration. Let the vector
of auxiliary VAR parameters associated with simulated data of length T periods
from the DSGE model be denoted T (). The corresponding parameter vector
from the VAR on the actual data of lengh T periods is denoted aT . Under the
null hypothesis that the DSGE model is correct, the Wald statistic W () for a
test of the model against the data is based on the di¤erence between the VAR
parameters estimated from the data aT , and the mean VAR parameter vector
T;N () estimated from N bootstrapped samples from the DSGE model:20
W () =d0
() 1d (10)
where d  aT   T;N () and 
() 1 is the inverse variance-covariance matrix
of the distribution of d.
Notice that the Wald test statistic can simply be interpreted as a quadratic
loss function in the deviations of the VAR parameters estimated on the data
19Wickens (2011, pp. 506-8) has shown that DSGE models will have a VARMA or VARIMA
representation. Indirect inference can proceed with approximations to this because the re-
searcher runs a VAR (or VECM) using the data from the simulated model; hence the models
simulations of the approximation give rise to the distribution against which the approximating
VAR or VECM on the data is tested for whether it comes from this distribution.
20Bootstrapping N samples avoids the weaknesses associated with a test based on a single
random sample of simulated data.
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from those implied (on average) by the bootstrapped DSGE model; as such it
is unambiguously greater than zero. The weights attached to each parameter
will generally depend on the joint uncertainty about all estimated parameters
in the VAR,21 but those parameters whose estimates vary less from sample to
sample will be given a higher weight in the test. Essentially the Wald statistic
is assessing whether the VAR parameters from the data fall outside the joint
condence limit of the model-simulated parameter distribution. High values of
the Wald statistic will reject the null hypothesis that the DSGE model is the
data-generating process (DGP) because they tell us that it is unlikely the VAR
parameters in the data could have been generated by the simulated model.
Finally, it should be noted that the Wald statistic has typically been com-
pared to its simulated bootstrap distribution and not the asymptotic distrib-
ution implied by theory under the null. It is therefore the percentiles of the
bootstrap distribution that provide the basis for accepting or rejecting a partic-
ular model, with a Wald statistic higher than the 95% critical value being the
standard rejection criterion. The Wald test is thus an example of what Canova
(2007) calls a size testof an economic model. In a simple univariate size test
the researcher might compare (say) a particular correlation in the data with the
distribution of correlations implied by many simulations of an economic model,
rejecting the model if the real-world correlation does not fall within a 95% in-
terval.22 The Wald test is based on the same underlying logic, but it is more
general because it enables the researcher to conduct an overall test of the model
based on its joint parameter distribution. Moreover, it is important to note that
although the Wald statistic in Equation (10) considers only a direct test of the
VAR parameters, the test can easily be augmented to include (say) the variances
of key macro variables or the impulse response functions implied by the VAR
coe¢ cients. The papers we discuss below take this more general approach, so
we provide some technical details in a footnote for interested readers.23
5.3 Testing the degree of nominal rigidity in the US econ-
omy using indirect inference
Le et al. (2011) use indirect inference to investigate the degree of nominal
rigidity in the US economy in the postwar period. This paper provides a useful
example of indirect inference and is relevant to our discussion here, because it
sheds light on the performance of New Keynesian models in formal statistical
tests. Le et al. consider a weighted version of the Smets and Wouters (2007)
US model in which a New Classical sector with exible wages and prices and
21The reasoning is simply that a DSGE model implies a joint parameter distribution, be-
cause it is a set of simultaneous equations.
22For example, Lim and McNelis (2008, Ch. 9, pp. 17172) simulate the distribution of
the real-wage employment correlation in an open economy New Keynesian model and discuss
how a size test could be conducted using this distribution.
23 If we let g(:) denote a vector valued function that includes the di¤erent aspects of the
data that are to be tested, the Wald statistic will be amended to W () = d0
() 1d, where
now d  g(aT )  g(T;N ()) .
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a one-quarter information lag are introduced. The coe¢ cients of the model
 including the relative weight on the New Classical sector  are chosen to
minimize the Wald statistic in the VAR parameters and the variances of key
macro variables. Several notable results emerge. The most striking results
come from the post-1984 Great Moderation period: the Wald-minimizing model
has a weight of almost 1 on the New Keynesian wage and price sectors and
passes the Wald test comfortably with a percentile of 83.8%.24 These results
conrm that New Keynesian models with rational expectations can successfully
mimic some key features of the data and pass a stringent statistical test against
macro data. Interestingly, when the model is estimated on the entire postwar
period the Wald-minimizing weights on the New Keynesian part of the model
are noticeably lower (suggesting that nominal rigidity has increased over time),
and the minimum Wald of 98.7% exceeds the standard 95% cut-o¤ value, so
that the model is rejected, although it would pass a more lenient test at 99%.
Overall, the results of Le et al. provide support for New Keynesian models while
suggesting, at the same time, that there is scope to improve upon the benchmark
model. In the next section we ask whether a behavioral expectations version of
the New Keynesian model can do so.
We focus on behavioral expectations as an alternative because these models
have had some success in accounting for puzzles in the nance literature. For
instance, Bernatzi and Thaler (1995) show how loss aversion could account
for the equity premium puzzle, while De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) show
that a behavioral nance model of the foreign exchange market can produce
excess kurtosis and fat-tails in exchange rate returns features which have been
documented in numerous empirical studies of nancial markets. The behavioral
nance approach has also had some success in formal statistical tests against the
data. As shown by ap Gwilym (2010), for example, a simple behavioral nance
model in the spirit of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) cannot be rejected as
the data-generating process (DGP) of the FTSE, based on all its time series
properties. One problem, however, is that empirical tests of individual series
come up against low power to reject the null that the model is the DGP, as
demonstrated by the fact that Meenagh et al. (2007) showed in earlier paper
that an e¢ cient markets model incorporating rational expectations and regime-
switching could also match the time series properties of the FTSE. This di¢ culty
points to need for higher-power multivariate tests to distinguish between rational
and behavioural expectations as the DGP. The macro test we discuss in the next
section is a multivariate test that overcomes the problem of low power.
5.4 A test of rational versus behavioral expectations in a
macro model of the US
Liu and Minford (2012) test a rational expectations version of the baseline
New Keynesian model against a version based on behavioral expectations. The
behavioral model is a stylized DSGE model similar to the model in De Grauwe
24The standard percentile that must be exceeded for rejection of the model is 95%.
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(2010). It includes a standard aggregate demand equation, an aggregate supply
function, and a Taylor rule:
ext = ~Etext+1   a1(Rt   ~Ett+1) + "1t (11)
t = b1ext +  ~Ett+1 + k"2t (12)
Rt = (1  c1)(c2t + c3ext) + c1Rt 1 + "3t (13)
where ext is the output gap, t is the rate of ination, Rt is the nominal interest
rate, and "1t, "2t, and "3t are the demand error, supply error and policy error
respectively. These errors are assumed to be autoregressive processes. The
errors are extracted from the model and the data; thus the model implies the
errors, conditional on the data. Equation (11) is the aggregate demand equation,
where ~E refers to expectations that are not formed rationally. The aggregate
demand function is standard, including the expectation of output gap in the
next period and real interest rate. Equation (12) is a New Keynesian Phillips
curve augmented with behavioral expectations. Equation (13) is a Taylor rule
with interest rate smoothing.
The di¤erence between the behavioral and rational expectations model lies
in expectations formation. The expectation term in the behavioural model, ~E
is the weighted average of two kinds of forecasting rule. One is the fundamental
forecasting rule, by which agents forecast the output gap or ination at their
steady state values. The other one is the extrapolative rule, by which individuals
extrapolate the most recent value into the future. Thus:
~Eft ext+1 = 0 (14)
~Eet ext+1 = ext 1 (15)
~Etart t+1 = 0 (16)
~Eextt t+1 = t 1 (17)
Equation (14) and (15) are the forecasting rules for the output gap, while
Equation (16) and (17) are the equivalents for ination. The steady state output
gap is zero, while the ination target in the Taylor Rule is the steady state
ination rate, set at zero since the data is linearly detrended and demeaned.
In De Grauwe (2010), it is assumed that the market forecast is the weighted
average of the fundamentalist and extrapolative rules. Equation (18) is the
market forecast for the output gap, while Equation (19) is for ination.
~Etext+1 = f;t  0 + e;text 1 = e;text 1 (18)
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~Ett+1 = tar;t  0 + ext;tt 1 = ext;tt 1 (19)
where f;t and e;t are the probabilities that agents will use a fundamentalist
and extrapolative rule for forecasting the output gap, tar;t and ext;t are the
equivalents for ination. These probabilities sum to one and are determined by
past success of the two rules in an intuitive way.
The solution method to the behavioural model is obtained by substituting
the expectation formation of Equation (18) and (19) into Equation (11) and
(12). The model therefore becomes
ext = e;text 1   a1(Rt   ext;tt 1) + "1t (20)
t = b1ext + (ext;tt 1) + k"2t (21)
Rt = (1  c1)(c2t + c3ext) + c1Rt 1 + "3t (22)
As Equations (20)-(22) make clear, the behavioural expectations model is purely
backward-looking.
The stylized DSGE model with rational expectation is dened as Equation
(11)-(13) except that the expectations are formed rationally. The only speci-
cation di¤erence between the two models is in the nature of these expectations.
Thus the comparison precisely tests the di¤erent specication of expectations,
allowing each model the benet of reestimation of parameter values. The ratio-
nal expectation version of the model can be solved in the standard way; Dynare
(Juillard, 2001) is used for this.
For this model the results, after allowing each model to be reestimated by
indirect estimation (in practice this involves a search for the value of the co-
e¢ cient vector  that minimizes the Wald), are shown in Table below. The
Table shows the Wald percentiles for both models, broken down by variances
(volatility) alone, VAR coe¢ cients (dynamics) alone, and the full vector of
descriptors. In all aspects the behavioural model is strongly rejected, whereas
the rational expectations model is easily accepted with high p-values (100 mi-
nus the Wald percentile). It must be emphasised that this is after allowing each
model to explore all possible values for all the models parameters, to nd the
set of parameter values that gets closest to the data behaviour. Each model is
then tested on its own bestparameters.
It may seem counter-intuitive that a theory of expectations so apparently
unrealistic as rational expectations can replicate macro behaviour so much
better than apparently realisticalternatives such as behavioural expectations.
However, as Muth (1961) notes, in an economy with informed and misinformed
agents, the well-informed can prot by selling their superior information to the
misinformed, so that market outcomes will come to be dominated by those
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Wald percentile (%) Behavioral Rational
Dynamics (VAR coe¤s) 100 90.0
Volatility (variances) 96.0 24.2
Overall (all ) 100 79.8
Table 1: Comparison of Behavioural and Rational Expectations Models, indi-
rectly re-estimated Parameters
with rational expectations.25 Keynes (1930, 160) made the same point when he
observed that actions based on inaccurate anticipations will not long survive
experiences of a contrary character, so that the facts will soon override antic-
ipation except where they agree. In todays world, these observations would
appear to have even greater force. For instance, Minford and Peel (2002) ar-
gue that rational expectations rests on the ability of competitive markets in
information to process it e¢ ciently: industries grow up to make these markets
as e¢ cient as possible such as analysts, portfolio advisers, forecasters, hedge
funds, and investment banks. The ordinary personmay not have literal ra-
tional expectations but is enabled to access sources that do have them. Under
this argument, realistic but non-rational expectations are driven out by these
sources, so that models based on them cannot t the data behavior.26
6 Conclusion
We have surveyed recent theoretical literature comparing ination targeting (IT)
and price-level targeting (PT) as macroeconomic stabilization policies, focusing
in particular on New Keynesian models and areas that have seen signicant
developments since Amblers (2009) survey: the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates; nancial frictions; and optimal monetary policy. The main con-
clusion reached by Ambler (2009) was that the ability of PT to improve the
ination-output volatility trade-o¤ in New Keynesian models rests with the as-
sumption of rational expectations. The recent literature suggests that things
are somewhat more complicated than this. In particular, we highlight an im-
portant split in the literature: PT consistently outperforms IT when policy
is described by simple Taylor-type rules, but results favouring PT which are
derived from optimal policies  under either commitment or discretion  are
25Shiller (1978, p. 39) takes issue with this line of reasoning. He argues that if the economy
takes a long time to converge on the rational expectations equilibrium, occassional changes
in the structure of the economy may prevent a rational expectations equilibrium ever being
attained. Shillers argument is cited by Maddock and Carter (1982), who provide an excellent
down-to-earth discussion of the macro implications of rational expectations.
26This argument relies on the assumption that the ordinary person is not deliberately
misled by sources with rational expectations who have an informational advantage. While
examples of such behaviour are observed in the real world, these actions are unlikely to be
systematic feature of the marketplace in competitive economies with strong property rights,
because they would lead to punishment ex post either by withdrawal of custom or enforcement
of the law.
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fragile to the assumptions one makes about the economic environment faced by
the policymaker, in the sense that they can be easily overturned with small de-
viations from the baseline New Keynesian model. We also argue, however, that
Taylor-type rules are the case of most relevance for central banks in practice
because, unlike optimal policies, rules are easy to implement and robust across
alternative models. We thus emerge with a more precise version of Amblers
original conclusion that we view as relevant for real-world central banks: PT
tends to improve macro stabilization in New Keynesian models with rational
expectations when policymakers commit to Taylor-type rules.
Several of the extensions in the theoretical literature that we surveyed are
initial attempts to address issues raised by the nancial crisis that have led
some to question the wisdom of central banks paying attention to PT, due to
its reliance on rational expectations and New Keynesian models. A new nding
that emerges from the recent literature is that PT is potentially very attractive
in the context of the zero bound because, in conditions of deationary reces-
sion, a price-level target induces expectations of higher than usual ination.
These expectations in turn induce negative real interest rates which stimulate
economic activity out of the recession as well as putting an end to the deation
and the zero bound situation. This mechanism is much stronger than the equiv-
alent mechanism under an ination target and therefore raises the possibility
of safely lowering trend ination under a PT regime. The recent literature sug-
gests that this dual mandate a price-level target with a lower trend ination
rate could bring substantial welfare gains, though the (strong) assumption of
perfect credibility of PT is likely to be crucial for this result. There is also ev-
idence from the recent literature that augmenting New Keynesian models with
nancial frictions leaves intact the potential welfare gains from PT, albeit that
this literature is currently at an early stage.
Since the benecial e¤ects of PT appear to hang on the joint assumption
that economic agents are rational and the economy New Keynesian, we devoted
the second half of the survey to experimental and survey evidence on whether
expectations are rational, and the applied macro literature on the empirical
performance of New Keynesian models. In addition, we surveyed a more recent
strand of applied literature that has formally tested New Keynesian models
and alternative forms of expectation formation. Overall the evidence is not
conclusive, but we showed that New Keynesian models are able to match a
number of dynamic features in the data and that behavioral models of the
macroeconomy do not appear to outperform those with rational expectations
in formal statistical tests. Accordingly, we concluded that policymakers should
continue to pay attention to PT in the future.
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